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Congress's Amendment to Section 104 of the Tax
Code Will not Clarify the Tax Treatment of
Damages and Will Lead to Arbitrary Distinctions
Sharon E. Stedman*

INTRODUCTION

In August 20, 1996, Uncle Sam once again raised taxes. The
vehicle for this tax increase was the Small Business Job Protection Act
(Small Business Act) of 1996.1 The Small Business Act involved tax
provisions for small businesses,2 provided various tax credits for
parents who adopt a child,3 and increased the minimum wage.4
Although the Act appears innocuous, there are controversial changes
to the tax code tucked away in the revenue provision of the act,
including the amendment of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)
§ 104.' In making the amendment to section 104, Congress hoped to
raise an additional $662 million over a period of ten years. 6
The purpose of the amendment was to clarify the tax treatment
of damages.7 In doing so, the amendment deals with three areas of
* B.A. 1995, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law
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through this endeavor, specifically Judi Lemos for the encouragement and David Starks for the
editorial comments. In addition, the author would like to thank the Law Review for all of their
hard work. Most of all, the author would like to thank her husband, Jeff Stedman, for his
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1. See The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110
Stat. 1755, 1837 (1996) (codified at I.R.C. § 104 (West Supp. 1997)).
2. See id. at §§1101-1501.
3. See id. at § 1807.
4. See id. at § 2104.
5. See id. at § 1605 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 104 (West Supp. 1997)).
6. See Tax Legislation: Small Business Tax Package on Way To White House After Senate
Vote, [1996] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 150, at D-3 (Aug. 5, 1996).
7. See The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
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the law: taxation of physical injury damages, taxation of emotional
distress damages, and taxation of punitive damages.' Although the
amendment addresses punitive damages, a recent decision by the
Supreme Court has rendered the issue moot.' Thus, punitive damages
are not discussed in this article.
Prior to the amendment of I.R.C. § 104, the manner in which
damages were treated for tax purposes depended on the nature of the
claim;' ° to avoid taxation, a claim had to be either a tort or a violation
of a tort-type right." Consequently, to avoid taxation, attorneys
creatively argued that their clients' claims were torts. 2
In an effort to solve this problem, Congress sought to clarify the
tax treatment of damages so that the taxation of damages would not
depend on the nature of the claim. 3 However, the amendment
merely replaced one vague phrase with another. The ambiguous term
"personal injury" has been replaced by "personal physical injury," a
14
term that is equally ambiguous.
Accordingly, the tax treatment of damages will still depend on the
nature of the claim. In order to avoid taxation, a claim must be
characterized as one involving a "personal physical injury." This is
problematic because the amendment does not define what constitutes
Instead, the meaning of "personal
a "personal physical injury."
physical injury" is left to the courts and attorneys to determine.
Undoubtedly, this will result in much needless litigation to decide the
definition of "personal physical injury." Therefore, Congress's goal of
clarifying the tax treatment of damages will not succeed.
This Note examines the recent amendment of I.R.C. § 104 and
argues that the amendment will not clarify the tax treatment of
8. See id.
9. The new amendment to I.R.C. § 104 states that punitive damages are not excludable
from gross income unless the punitive damages are awarded in a wrongful death action and the
state law limits the available damages in a wrongful death action to punitive damages. This
amendment is prospective. I.R.C. § 104 (West Supp. 1997). However, the Supreme Court ruled
in O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996), that punitive damages are taxable income.
This decision resolved a split in the circuits and clarified the prior tax treatment of punitive
damages awarded in personal injury cases. See O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 454, 458. Furthermore,
punitive damages awarded in nonphysical injury cases have been taxable income since the 1989
amendment to I.R.C. § 104. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (1994); O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 457.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, pt. II, at 142-43 (1996), microforred on Sup. Docs. No.
Y 1.1/8 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
11. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992).
12. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 333 (1995) (arguing that age discrimination
was a tort or violated a tort-type right). See also Burke, 504 U.S. at 238 (arguing that sexual
discrimination was a tort or violated a tort-type right).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143 (1996).
14. See The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
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damages, but will instead lead to inequitable results and arbitrary
distinctions. Part I explores the policy justifications for the exclusion
of damage awards from gross income and provides a brief overview of
section 104. Next, in Part II, the Article reflects upon the tax
treatment of damages prior to the recent amendment. In doing so,
Part II focuses on the relevant case law and revenue rulings. Turning
toward the tax treatment of damages under the new amendment, Part
III examines Congress's intent in amending section 104. Finally, Part
IV discusses the ramifications of the new amendment on damages for
physical injuries and damages for emotional distress and illustrates that
the new amendment is problematic. This article concludes that the
amendment to section 104 will not clarify the tax treatment of damages
as intended by Congress and ends with suggestions on how section 104
could be amended so as to achieve the clarity sought by Congress.
PART I
A.

Policy Explanationsfor the Tax Treatment of
Damages Under Section 104
Although the tax code defines income broadly, 5 the Internal
Revenue Code, for tax and public policy reasons, has many exclusions
to income. One such exclusion is found in section 104 for damages
received "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness."' 6 The most common policy explanations for this exclusion are
(1) the return of capital theory; 7 (2) the involuntary nature of the
transaction theory;"8 (3) the compassion or humanitarianism theory; 9
(4) the imputed income theory;20 and (5) the bunching of income
21
theory.
The return of capital theory is the most common explanation for
the section 104 exclusion.22 Return of capital is a payment received
that equals a taxpayer's investment or basis in an item.23 As such, a

15. "[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived .. " I.R.C. § 61(a)
(1994).
16. I.R.C. § 104 (West Supp. 1997).
17. See Robert Illig,
Tort Reform and the Tax Code: An Opportunity to Narrow the Personal
Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1463 (1995).
18. See id. at 1465.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 1466.
22. See id. at 1463.
23. See Bumet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1931) (holding that the taxpayer's recovery
of basis in the item is not a taxable event).
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taxpayer can have capital in his or her body, which consists of physical
and mental health. Under this approach, damage awards are considered to be a return of capital. When a taxpayer's mental or physical
health is injured, a damage award compensates a taxpayer for the
injury and, in doing so, returns the lost capital.2 4 This mirrors a
traditional principle in tort law that the purpose of compensatory
damages is to put the injured party in the position that he or she
would have been had the party not been injured.
Thus, the
26
damages make the injured party whole.
Nonetheless, this theory has been criticized.27 In order to have
a return of capital, a taxpayer must first have a basis in his or her
body.21 However, a taxpayer cannot be said to have a basis in his or
her body because human bodies are not purchased.29 Furthermore,
a person's basis in his or her body cannot be the cost to maintain that
body because a taxpayer deducts those costs in the annual personal
exemption.3" Accordingly, the return of capital theory alone cannot
adequately explain the policy underlying the section 104 exclusion.
A second policy explanation for the exclusion of damage awards
is based on the involuntary nature of the transaction. In short, a
plaintiff does not ask to be injured. 31 Therefore, under this theory,
section 104 is analogous to other sections of the tax code that afford
special tax treatment to involuntary transactions.32 For example,
I.R.C. section 1033 allows a taxpayer to postpone gain after an
involuntary conversion of property.33 Under this section, if a
taxpayer's property is destroyed, the taxpayer can exclude any gain
received from insurance, but only if the taxpayer reinvests the money

24. See Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that
"[d]amages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the
taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights-because, in effect, they restore a loss to
capital").
25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990). "The rationale behind compensatory damages is to restore the injured party to the position he or she was in prior to the injury."
Id. (citing Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, C.A. Fla., 307 F.2d 432, 434 (1962)).
26. See id.
27. See generally Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993) (stating that the Court
has rejected the return on capital theory), affd, 33 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
28. See Illig, supra note 17, at 1464.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1464 & n.20 (citing Jennifer J. S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage
Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 759, 766-68 (1988)).
31. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S
GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS § 2.04, at 43 (7th ed. 1994).
32. See id.
33. See I.R.C. § 1033(b) (West Supp. 1997).
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into a replacement property.3 4 However, sections 104 and 1033 are
not analogous. Even though section 1033 allows for a postponement
of gain, section 1033, unlike section 104, does not create an exclusion
from income. Consequently, this policy is inadequate for explaining
the exclusion under section 104.
A third theory that has been put forth to explain the exclusion for
damages is based on the principles of compassion and humanitarianUnder this rationale, section 104 excludes a taxpayer's
ism.3"
damages because the taxpayer is considered to have suffered enough.36
Under this theory, the exclusion for damages under section 104 is
compared to section 101 of the code, 37 which excludes from gross
38
income all amounts "received . . . under a life insurance contract.1
Thus, under the theory of compassion or humanitarianism, an analogy
is drawn between Congress's compassion for a bereaving family
member and Congress's compassion for an injured taxpayer.39
Additionally, the compassion theory might explain the tendency for
courts to expand the section 104 exclusion, a tendency that runs
contrary to the usual judicial practice of narrowly interpreting
exclusions from income. 40 However, this theory cannot adequately
explain section 104's exclusion for the simple reason that not all
damages awarded to an injured taxpayer are excluded from income.41
A fourth possible explanation for the exclusion rests on the
imputed income theory.42 There are two types of imputed income.
43
One type is income derived from the use of "household durables.
Under this type of imputed income, the owner of a house is said to
have imputed income because if the taxpayer did not own the house,
the taxpayer would have to pay a landlord rent.44 This saving of rent
34. See I.R.C. § 1033(a). The gain is preserved because the basis of the destroyed property
is carried over to the replacement property. Any gain will be postponed until the taxpayer sells
the replacement property. See I.R.C. § 1033(b).
35. See Illig, supra note 17, at 1465; see also, Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696
(9th Cir. 1983) (describing the humanitarian theory as "a feeling that the injured party, who has
suffered enough, should not be further burdened with the practical difficulty of sorting out the
taxable and nontaxable components of a lump-sum award").
36. See Roemer, 716 F.2d at 696.
37. See I.R.C. § 101(a) (West Supp. 1997); see also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.04, at
43.
38. See I.R.C. 101(a). See also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.03, at 39 (stating that
under the life insurance exclusion, "there is a heavy flavor of condolence about the whole affair").
39. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.04, at 40.
40. See Illig, supra note 17, at 1461, 1466.
41. See id. at 1466.
42. See id. at 1465.
43. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, § 1.03, at 23.
44. See id.
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payments is considered imputed income. The second type of imputed
income involves the taxpayer who enjoys the fruits of his or her
labor.4" For example, when a lawyer writes his or her own will rather
than paying someone else to write it, this savings in payment is
imputed income to the lawyer. However, in both cases the IRS does
not include this amount in gross income.46
The imputed income theory has been used to explain the
exclusion of damages from gross income. 47 An example of such an
exclusion would be when a jury awards a husband damages for the loss
of consortium for the death of his wife. Inherent in such a damage
award is an amount for the loss of the wife's services, and this amount
is considered imputed income. Therefore, under existing tax policy,
it would not be taxed. However, the use of the imputed income theory
as a basis for excluding damages for income has been criticized because
the decision by the IRS not to tax imputed income is based on
valuation problems. 41 But, tort-related damages are paid in cash so
there is no problem of valuation.49
A fifth policy justification for the section 104 exclusion is based
on the bunching of income theory.50 The bunching of income theory
is based on the idea that "it is unfair to subject such an award (or
settlement) to the progressive rate structure of federal income tax, since
[sic] the bunching usually forces the recipient into a higher marginal
tax bracket."'" While in the case of back pay or lost profits the
taxpayer would have spread the amount over many years, taxpayers
often receive damage awards as a lump sum payment.
To illustrate the bunching of income theory, assume that age
discrimination damage awards are taxable income, that the taxpayer
files a claim for age discrimination, and that, in a settlement, the
taxpayer receives $260,000 in back pay for the previous four years.52

45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Illig,
supra note 17, at 1465.
48. See Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 43, 48-49 (1987-1988) (citing Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of
the Family in a Comprehensive & Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1613 (1977)
(stating that problems of valuing imputed income include identifying the tax base and attaching
values to particular services)); Illig,
supra note 17, at 1465 & n.29 (citing Cochran, supra).
49. See Cochran, supra note 48, at 49; Illig,
supra note 17, at 1465.
50. See Illig,
supra note 17, at 1466.
51. Cochran, supra note 48, at 49.
52. This example assumes that the taxpayer has no other source of income. In addition,
this example does not allow for any deduction (standard or otherwise) or any personal exemptions.
Furthermore, this example does not account for inflation. For a similar example see Edward
Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations,62 CORNELL L. REV.
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Under these circumstances, the taxpayer's tax liability for the year of
receipt is $83,732." 3 However, under this example, if the taxpayer
had earned the $260,000 over the four years, the taxpayer would have
had taxable income of $65,000 for each year. This would result in a
total tax liability for the four years of $62,688.1 4 But, if the taxpayer
receives the damage award in one year instead of four, the taxpayer
pays and additional $21,044 of tax.
However, this theory has been criticized because Congress can
easily alleviate the bunching of income.5 For example, Congress
could average the damage award over the relevant period. In doing so,
the taxpayer would not have to report the entire award as income for
one year. Further, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminates the code's
income averaging sections,5 6 which would indicate that the bunching
of income is not of great congressional concern. Consequently, this
theory is also unable to adequately explain the section 104 exclusion.
In short, none of the aforementioned policies can adequately
explain why section 104 excludes specific types of damages from
income. Part of this problem lies in the nature of damages themselves.
Compensatory damages are just that-compensation for an injury.
They are intended to make a person whole, not to provide a windfall
gain. 7 However, with juries awarding larger damage awards, there is
a potential for more tax revenue. Courts and Congress are thus at
odds with each other, and unless we are willing to change our belief
about the nature of compensatory damages, they simply cannot be
classified as an "accession to wealth."5 " In order to fully understand
Congress's amendment to section 104 and the policies behind the
amendment, a brief overview of section 104 is necessary.

701, 716 (1977).
53. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (1996). Tax liability is calculated as follows: $79,772 plus 39.6% of
the excess of $250,000.
54. See id. Tax liability is calculated as follows: $12,107 plus 31% of the excess over
$53,500. This amount is $15,672 for each year or $62,688 for four years.
55. See Cochran, supra note 48, at 49.
56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 141(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2117 (1986)
(repealing §§ 26 U.S.C. 1301-1305).
57. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 390.
58. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining income
as any "accession to wealth").
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Brief Overview of Section 104

Section 61(a) of the tax code liberally defines income as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided ... gross income means all income
from whatever source derived."' 9 According to the Supreme Court,
income is any "accession to wealth,"6 over which the taxpayer has
"complete control."61 As a result of this all-inclusive language, a
taxpayer must find an exclusion in the tax code in order to avoid
paying taxes on any income received.62 A problem from the taxpayer's perspective, however, is that courts interpret exclusions from
63
income narrowly.
One such exclusion is section 104 of the tax code. Before the
1996 amendment, this exclusion applied to "any damages received...
on account of personal injuries or sickness. '64 Because the term
"personal injures or sickness" was difficult to define, this exclusion was
the source of much confusion. To exacerbate matters, neither the tax
code nor the Treasury Regulations defined "personal injury or6
sickness." However, the Regulations defined "damages received
as "an amount received ... through prosecution of a legal suit or
action based upon tort or tort type rights .... 66
This definition forced attorneys to draw analogies between their
clients' claim and a tort or tort-type right. In turn, this forced courts
to determine if the claim in question was a tort as defined by the
Treasury Regulations. 67 The Supreme Court, in an attempt to resolve
the confusion, decided United States v. Burke,68 stating that for a
taxpayer to qualify for the section 104 exclusion, both the injury and
the remedy available must be tort-like.69 In 1995 the Supreme Court,

59. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
60. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431. See definition supra note 58.
61. See id.
62. See I.R.C. § 61(a).
63. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) (stating that exemptions are
specifically stated and should be construed with restraint).
64. I.R.C. § 104 (a)(2) (1994).
65. Id.
66. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693 (arguing that compensatory damages received in a
defamation suit are excludable from gross income).

68. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
69. Id. at 239-41. To add to the confusion in this field, courts treat "tort-like" and "torttype right" as synonyms. Compare Burke, 504 U.S. at 232, 234 (tort-like), with Commissioner
v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 334 (1995) (describing the holding of Burke as analyzing a tort-type
right).
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once again, addressed this issue in Commissioner v. Schleier.70 In
Schleier, the Court held that in order to qualify for the section 104
exclusion, the injury must be tort-like (both in injury and remedy) and
that there must be a linear causal relationship between the personal
injury and the damages received. 7'
In August of 1996, the tax treatment of damages changed
dramatically. Section 104 was amended. The amended section 104
states that damages are excludable from gross income if they are
received "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness." 72 In addition, the amendment provides that "[e]motional
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness." 73 This amendment will have sweeping effects.
First, unless a taxpayer's damage award is for a physical injury,
any damages received on account of that injury will be considered
taxable income. Therefore, under the new tax treatment, damages
received for a violation of a taxpayer's First Amendment rights are
taxable income. 74 Also, damages received for sexual discrimination
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are taxable
income.7 5 Furthermore, damages received for slander and libel will
In short, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate
be taxable income.
a physical injury, the above claims are merely considered dignitary
wrongs and, under the new treatment, will be taxable income.
The second major change includes damages received for emotional
distress. Under the amended code, damages for emotional distress that
do not reimburse the taxpayer for medical treatment incurred in an
attempt to alleviate the emotional distress are now considered taxable

70. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
71. See id. at 336-37.
72. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605 [emphasis added].
73. Id.
74. See Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3rd Cir. 1987), affg, 87 T.C. 236 (1986)
(holding that a settlement for a suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of the First
Amendment right to free speech is excludable from gross income).
75. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61. The law on civil rights violations is anything but
clear. The IRS ruled that compensatory damages, including back pay, awarded under the 1991
amended Title VII, were excludable from gross income. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. at 6263. This revenue ruling also announced that damages awarded for racial discrimination under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were excludable from gross income.
See id. This ruling also applied to damages received under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
See id. at 63. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Schleier, the IRS suspended Rev.
Rul. 93-88. See I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-2 C.B. 330, superseded by Rev. Rul. 96-65 1996-53
I.R.B. 5. After the passage of the Small Business Act, the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 96-65, which
overruled Rev. Rul. 93-88. See Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-53 I.R.B. 5. See infra note 108 for
discussion of Rev. Rul. 96-95.
76. See Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51.
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income.7 7 However, if a taxpayer can demonstrate that the emotional
distress flowed from a physical injury, rather than demonstrating that
the emotional distress78 caused a physical injury, the damage award
should avoid taxation.
Through this amendment, Congress hoped to clarify the tax
treatment of damages and end the needless litigation. Unfortunately,
the new amendment will render the same result. To illustrate, a
discussion of the prior tax treatment of damages follows.
PART II
A.

The Prior Tax Treatment of Damages Resulted in Much Litigation
The relevant portions of the pre-1996 I.R.C. § 104 read:
(a) In general.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and
not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to
medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does
not include (2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic payments) on
account of personal injuries or sickness.79

As previously discussed, neither the tax code nor the Treasury
Regulations define "personal injuries or sickness," although the
Regulations do define "damages received" as "an amount received...
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort
"80 However, a tort is "a private or civil wrong or
type rights.
1
Thus, almost all claims "independent of contract" are
injury.""
considered torts. 2 Therefore, under the pre-1996 amendment,
attorneys argued that their clients' claims were torts and were therefore

77. See The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
78. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143-44 (1996). "If an action has its origin in a physical
injury or physical sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical sickness whether or not
the recipient of the damages is the injured party." Id.
79. I.R.C. § 104 (1994).
80. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1995).
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990). "A legal wrong committed upon the
person or property independent of contract. It may be either (1) a direct invasion of some legal
right of the individual; (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues
to the individual; (3) the violation of some private obligation by which like damage accrues to the
individual." Id. at 1489.
82. Id.
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excluded, under section 104, from income. 3 Consequently, the
Supreme Court attempted to narrow the tax treatment of damages.
The Court first attempted to clarify the Treasury Regulation's
definition in United States v. Burke. 4
1. United States v. Burke
In United States v. Burke, the Supreme Court decided whether
damages awarded under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196485
were excludable from gross income under section 104.86 Judy
Hutcheson, an employee of The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
claimed that her employer had discriminated against her because of her
gender.8 7 The basis of the complaint was that TVA paid male
employees higher wages than similarly situated female employees.8 8
In a settlement agreement, TVA agreed to pay five million dollars to
be shared by all affected employees.8 9 When the settlement was
distributed, TVA withheld federal income tax from each employee's
payment. 90
After unsuccessful attempts to obtain a tax refund, Burke and
other employees initiated a lawsuit. 9 When the case reached the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court determined that both
the "beginning and end of the inquiry" was whether the injury and
claim were "personal" and "tort-like in nature."9 2 Based on this
limited inquiry, the Court of Appeals held that TVA's unlawful sexual
discrimination was a personal, tort-like injury, and therefore, the
damage award was excludable under section 104.91
In order to resolve the split among the circuits, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether section 104 excluded
Title VII damage awards. 94 The Court began its analysis by reason-

83. See Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697; see also Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305,
1307-8 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988) superseded by statute as stated in, O'Gilvie v.
U.S., 66 F.2d 155 (1995).
84. 504 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1992).
85. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e-16 (1994).
86. 504 U.S. at 242.
87. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 230-31.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 231.
90. See id. TVA did not withhold federal income taxes in the payment to Ms. Hutcheson.

Id.
91.
92.
at 1299),
93.
94.

See id. at 232.
Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Threlkeld, 87 T.C.
overruled, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
See Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d at 1123-24.
See Burke, 504 U.S. at 233 & n.3.
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ing that "remedial principles" are inherent in the definition of tort"
and, consequently, the "hallmark" of traditional tort liability was "a
broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for injuries
caused by the violation of his legal rights."' 9 6 The Court, however,
the nature of the claim; it also analyzed the
declined to only analyze
97
remedy.
the
of
nature
In doing so, the Court looked at Title VII's remedies that are
available to a successful claimant.9" The Court found that Title VII
limited available remedies to back pay, injunctions, and other equitable
relief, but did not allow for pain and suffering, emotional distress, or
other compensatory damages typically associated with a tort. 99
Therefore, the Court concluded that Title VII was not tort-like because
Thus,
it addressed "'legal injuries of an economic character.""'
the
compensation,
tort
traditional
because the taxpayers did not receive
damages were not excludable under section 104 and were taxable
income. 101
Prior to the Court's ruling in Burke, Congress amended Title VII
to allow a successful plaintiff to recover compensatory and punitive
damages." 2 In 1993, in response to the Burke decision's potential
impact on the amended Title VII, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 9388. 103
2. Revenue Ruling 93-88
Revenue Ruling 93-88 addressed Title VII and whether damages
received under the amended Title VI' 4 were excludable from gross
income. The ruling states:

95. See id. at 234.
96. Id. at 235 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 238-39.
100. Id. at 239 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
101. See id. at 242.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (West Supp. 1992) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994)). Section 102 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VII] against a respondent who
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination ... prohibited under [Title VIII ... the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages... in addition to
any relief authorized by [42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(gXl) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991].
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a)(1) (1994).
103. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, overruled by Rev. Rul. 96-95, 1996-53 I.R.B. 5.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (West Supp. 1992).

Tax Treatment of Damages

19971

Amounts received in satisfaction of claims of disparate treatment
discrimination made under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended in 1991, and 42 U.S.C. section 1981 are excludable under section 104(a)(2) of the Code. Amounts received in
satisfaction of claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act are
also excludable.'
However, after the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v.
Schleier' 6 the IRS suspended Revenue Ruling 93-88 and requested
further guidance from Congress.'0 7 Vhile awaiting this guidance,
the IRS did not issue a replacement ruling.'0 8 This resulted in
considerable ambiguity to the tax treatment of damages.'0 9
3.

Commissioner v. Schleier

In 1995, the Supreme Court once again addressed section 104 in
Commissioner v. Schleier.110 Schleier, a sixty-year-old airplane captain
working for United Airlines, was fired pursuant to the company's agebased policy."' Schleier brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)." 2 The parties settled and
Schleier received $145,629, fifty percent of which was considered back
pay, the other fifty percent of which was deemed liquidated damages. 113 Schleier's 1986 income tax return included the back pay

105. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, overruled by Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-53 I.R.B. 5.
106. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
107. See I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-2 C.B. 330, superseded by Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-53
I.R.B. 5.
108. After Congress passed the Small Business Act, which amended I.R.C. § 104, the IRS
issued a replacement ruling, Revenue Ruling 96-65. Revenue Ruling 96-65 replaced Revenue
Ruling 93-88 and superseded Notice 95-45. Revenue Ruling 96-65 reiterates that under the new
law, backpay received for Title VII claims are "not excludable from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2) because ... [backpay is not] received on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness .... " Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-53 I.R.B. 5. Further, this ruling states that
damages for emotional distress received for a Title VII claim are "not excludable from gross
income . . . except to the extent they are damages paid for medical care ... attributable to
emotional distress." Id. However, this ruling still does not provide any guidance in that the IRS
merely reiterates the obvious. Instead, the IRS should issue a ruling providing guidance to the
critical question: What is a personal physical injury or physical sickness?
109. Louise Ann Fernandez & Michael G. Dwyer, New Law Changes the Tax Status of
DamageAwards, PracticingLaw Institute Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook
Series, 548 PLI/LIT 811 (Oct. 1996), availablein WESTLAW, Practice Guides & CLE Materials
Library, Litigation File.
110. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
111. See id. at 325.
112. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West Supp. 1997).
113. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 326.
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amount but did not include the amount of liquidated damages." 4 As
a result, the IRS issued a deficiency notice, and Schleier filed suit
against the IRS Commissioner in Tax Court."'
The Tax court held that both the back pay and liquidated
damages should be excluded from gross income because the ADEA
claim was a tort-like cause of action. 116 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the tax court. 17 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits concerning the
taxability of ADEA awards".. and, in doing so, expanded its Burke
ruling.
First, the Court explained that Title VII awards are not based on
tort-type rights, because there are no provisions for jury trials or
punitive damages." 9 And, even if Title VII did provide for those
remedies, such a provision would not be sufficient to bring the
damages within the section 104 exclusion. The Court concluded that
the ADEA liquidated damages are not compensatory, and, therefore,
ADEA actions do not provide for the "hallmark" of traditional tort
liability and, consequently, are outside the scope of section 104."12
The Court stated that Burke did not mean that a recovery based
on a tort or a tort-type right was the "beginning and end of the
A taxpayer also had to satisfy a causation requireanalysis."''
122
the Court essentially introduced a second test to
Thus,
ment.
exclude damages under section 104. Under this second test, not only
must a recovery be based on a tort or tort-type right, but a taxpayer
' 12
must have received the damages "on account of personal injuries. 1
After hypothetically illustrating this need for a linear causal relation-

114. See id. at 327.
115. See id.
116. See Schleier v. Commissioner, 1993 WL 767976 (Tax Ct. 1993), affd, 26 F.3d 1119
(5th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
117. See Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 323
(1995).
118. See Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that damages
due to age discrimination are not excludable from gross income under section 104); but see
Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that damages due to age
discrimination are excludable from gross income under section 104), vacated and remanded, 115
S. Ct. 2573 (1995) (for consideration in light of Schleier).
119. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334-35.
120. See id. at 336.
121. Id. at 336.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 337. The "on account of personal injuries" is pulled directly from I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (1994).
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ship between the injury and the damages,' 24 the Court further
explained that the age discrimination was the cause of both the
personal injury and the lost wages. 2 ' However, the personal injury
did not cause the lost wages. Because there was no linear causation
there was no basis to exclude
between the injury and the lost wages,
26
the settlement from gross income.1
The Schleier decision is problematic because it draws unnecessary
and arbitrary distinctions. For example, lost wages under the ADEA
are considered taxable income. However, lost wages due to emotional
distress are not taxable income.' 27 The combination of this illogical
distinction and the suspension of Revenue Ruling 93-88 created
ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to the tax treatment of
damages.' 8 Congress attempted to resolve this ambiguity by passing
the Small Business and Job Protection Act of 1996.129
PART III
A.

The New Tax Treatment of Damages

On August 20, 1996, Congress attempted to clarify the tax
treatment of damages by amending section 104 of the tax code. This
move was an ill-considered attempt to fix a long-standing problem:
whether damage awards should be taxable. The vehicle for this change
was the Small Business Act. 30

124. The Court provided the following hypothetical:
Assume that a taxpayer is in an automobile accident, is injured, and as a result of that
injury suffers (a) medical expenses, (b) lost wages, and (c) pain, suffering, and emotional
distress that cannot be measured with precision. If the taxpayer settles a resulting
lawsuit for $30,000 (and if the taxpayer has not previously deducted her medical
expenses, see § 104(a)), the entire $30,000 would be excludable under § 104(a)(2). The
medical expenses for injuries arising out of the accident clearly constitute damages
received "on account of personal injuries." Similarly, the portion of the settlement
intended to compensate for pain and suffering constitutes damages "on account of
personal injury." Finally, the recovery for lost wages is also excludable as being "on
account of personal injuries," as long as the lost wages resulted from [the] [sic] time in
which the taxpayer was out of work as a result of her injuries.
Id. at 329.
125. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330-31.
126. See id. at 337.
127. See id. at 329.
128. Fernandez & Dwyer, supra note 109, at 811.
129. See The Small Business Job Protection Act § 1605.
130. See id.
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The Small Business Act moved rapidly through Congress 3 ' with
very little public debate or vocalized thought given to the policy
ramifications of the section 104 amendment. 132 Moreover, the
Senate's version of the bill amending section 104 did not discuss
compensatory damages but dealt only with the taxability of punitive
damages. 3 3 Senators believed that taxing compensatory damages was
too controversial. 34 In contrast to the Senate, the House version
dealt with compensatory damages.13' Therefore, the Senate requested
a conference with the House to resolve the discrepancy. 136 Unfortunately, however, the House version was selected primarily because of
37
the extra revenue the bill would raise.
In addition to raising revenue, Congress passed the amendment
to section 104 to clarify a much litigated area.'3 8 The existing law
required that a claim must be either a tort or tort-like in order to avoid
taxation of damages. Congress amended section 104 to ensure that the
tax treatment of a damage award did not depend on the nature of the
claim.'3 9 However, Congress failed at its attempt to clarify the tax
treatment of damages.
The amendment to section 104 changes several areas of tax
law. 40 First, the amendment replaces the phrase "personal injuries

131. The bill was introduced on May 14, 1996. It passed in the House on May 22, 1996,
and was referred to the Senate on June 6, 1996. It was amended and reported to the Senate on
June 18, 1996. The Senate began consideration of the bill on July 8,1996, and the bill passed
as amended on July 9, 1996. The bill went to conference on July 26, 1996. The conference
report was reported in the House and Senate on August 1, 1996. The House and Senate agreed
to the conference report on August 2, 1996. The President signed the bill on August 20, 1996.
See 104 Bill Tracking H.R. 3448, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT104 file.
132. See Tax Legislation, supra note 6, at D-3 (stating that, "The House debate on the bill
was dominated by the minimum wage increase, with little attention other than praise given to the
tax breaks."). This also is evidenced by the lack of statements and debates in the Congressional
Record.
133. See S. REP. No. 104-281, at 115-116 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1589-90.
134. See GOv'T. PRESS RELEASE 4104-234 (June 12, 1996) (Statement of Chairman Roth
at Markup on Adoption and Small Business Tax Bills).
135. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-737, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677.
136. See 142 CONG. REC. S8820 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Senator Lott).
137. See Tax Legislation, supra note 6, at D-3. "According to a Senate staff member, the
conferees chose the house version because of the additional revenue it would raise." Id.
138. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143 (1996). "The confusion as to the tax treatment
of damages received in cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness has led to
substantial litigation including two Supreme Court cases within the last four years." Id.
139. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143 (1996). "The taxation of damages received in
cases not involving a physical injury or physical sickness should not depend on the type of claim
made." Id.
140. The full text of the amendment is as follows:
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'
or sickness" with "personal physical injuries or physical sickness." 141
Second, the amendment states that emotional distress is not a physical
injury or physical sickness. 4 2
While these changes were designed to clarify the tax treatment of
damages, the statute does not define the phrase "physical injuries or
physical sickness." This phrase is left for the courts and the I.R.S. to
define. Furthermore, the tax treatment of a damage award will still
depend on the nature of the claim. Under the amended section, a
claim must be one involving a physical injury or physical sickness.
Consequently, to avoid taxation of the damage award, astute attorneys
will search through seemingly insignificant facts so as to find a
"physical injury or physical sickness." For example, in a sexual

(a) IN GENERAL-Paragraph (2) of section 104(a) (relating to compensation for
injuries or sickness) is amended to read as follows:
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account
of personal physical injuries or physical sickness;.
(b) EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AS SUCH TREATED AS NOT PHYSICAL
INJURY OR PHYSICAL SICKNESS.-Section 104(a) is amended by striking the last
sentence and inserting the following new sentence: "For purposes of paragraph (2),
emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. The
preceding sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount
paid for medical care (described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(d)(1))
attributable to emotional distress."
(c) APPLICATION OF PRIOR LAW FOR STATES IN WHICH ONLY
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTIONS.- Section 104 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d)
and by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
"(c) APPLICATION OF PRIOR LAW IN CERTAIN CASES.- The phrase '(other
than punitive damages)' shall not apply to punitive damages awarded in a civil action(1) which is a wrongful death action, and
(2) with respect to which applicable State law (as in effect of September 13, 1995
and without regard to any modification after such date) provides, or has been
construed to provide by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a decision
issued on or before September 13, 1995, that only punitive damages may be
awarded in such an action.
This subsection shall cease to apply to any civil action filed on or after the first date on
which the applicable State law ceases to provide (or is no longer construed to provide)
the treatment described in paragraph (2)."
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments made
by this section shall apply to amounts received after the date of the enactment of
this Act, in taxable years ending after such date.
(2) EXCEPTION.-The amendments made by this section shall not apply to any
amount received under a written binding agreement, court decree, or mediation
award in effect on (or issued on or before) September 13, 1995.
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See id.
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harassment case, an attorney might look to see if the client was bruised
from a pinch to prove that the client suffered a physical injury.
However, while the terms are left undefined, the House Report
does attempt to explain the meaning of the amendment. Under the
new law, if a claim is based on a physical injury or physical sickness,
then all damages that "flow therefrom" are treated as being received
"on account of personal physical injury or physical sickness."' 4 3
Using an example of an individual who is awarded damages for loss of
consortium for the physical injury or physical sickness of that
individual's spouse, 4 4 the House Report explains that the taxpayer's
award would be excludable from gross income because the loss of
consortium flows from a physical injury."' However, the House
Report merely reiterates the linear casual relationship stated in Schleier
without providing any guidance to the crucial question: What is a
physical injury or physical sickness?
Furthermore, the House Report states that juries typically award
lost profits in cases involving nonphysical injuries or sickness.146
Thus, in the opinion of Congress, there is no need to give preferential
tax treatment to a taxpayer who receives damages for a nonphysical
injury. 147 This assumption is based on the idea that had the taxpayer
worked and earned the profits, those profits would be taxable income,
and therefore, lost profits should still be taxable income. 4
The
House assumes that lost profits are typically awarded for nonphysical
injuries. However, the House provides no data to support this
significant assumption.
Unfortunately, this assumption will lead to inequitable results.
For instance, assault and false imprisonment may not involve a
physical injury, but the damages a jury awards may not be for lost
wages. Accordingly, this award will be taxable income even though
the damage award may be compensating a taxpayer for something
other than economic loss. In addition, this assumption will lead to a
victim of sexual harassment being treated differently by the IRS than
a victim of sexual assault. Both taxpayers are victims. Both suffered
humiliation. Yet, the taxpayer who is a victim of sexual assault will be
far more likely to have a physical injury and thus receive preferential
tax treatment. This is an arbitrary distinction, and the "ills of deficit

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 144 (1996).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 143.
See id.
See id.
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spending should not be carried on the backs of those who have been
149
hurt.
In addition, the Small Business Act changes the tax treatment of
damages received for emotional distress. Under this new treatment,
emotional distress is not a physical injury or physical sickness."' 0
According to the House Report, emotional distress includes "physical
symptoms [such as] insomnia, headaches, and stomach disorders which
may result from [the] emotional distress.""1 ' Therefore, taxpayers
cannot use physical manifestations of emotional distress to satisfy the
physical injury or physical sickness requirement. However, the
amendment continues to exempt from taxation any portion of the
emotional distress award actually used to pay for medical care of
injuries caused by the emotional distress." 2
Congress intended to clarify the tax treatment of damages by
taxing nonphysical injuries." 3 However, the tax treatment of damages should not depend on the arbitrary distinction of whether the
taxpayer is fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to have sustained a
physical injury. A victim of a dignitary wrong such as sexual
harassment has suffered no less of an injury than a taxpayer who broke
a leg in a car accident. Furthermore, a victim of sexual harassment
might be tormented for years before the taxpayer files suit, while the
taxpayer who broke his leg will most likely suffer pain for only a few
months. Also, dignitary wrongs such as sexual harassment inflict a
pain that is not easily remedied. Consequently, Congress should not
treat a taxpayer who is a victim of sexual harassment differently from
a taxpayer who is a victim of a car accident.
PART IV
A.

The New Amendment Does not Provide Any Guidance in Defining
What Constitutes a Personal Physical Injury

The amendment does not define physical injury, and tort victims
are left to wonder what exactly constitutes a personal physical injury.
Obviously, when there are severe physical signs of an injury a taxpayer
will be able to avoid taxation of any damage award. After all, few

149. Anne Scott, A Tax on Sexual Harassment?, BUS. REC., Sept. 9, 1996, at 5.
150. The Small Business and Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 144 n.24 (1996). "The committee intends that the
term emotional distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach disorders)
which may result from such emotional distress." Id.
152. See The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
153. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143.
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would argue that a person who lost a limb or is paralyzed has not
suffered a physical injury. However, the harder cases will be those
when a taxpayer has received only a minor physical injury, or when a
taxpayer has incurred pain without signs of a visible physical injury.
Under the new law, the courts must define physical injury.
Assuming the courts will not apply a "facts and circumstances test,"
as it would be a guaranteed invitation to litigation, courts will
undoubtedly develop a legal test to define "physical injury." Because
battery is an existing legal principle involving physical contact, the
courts might treat physical injury as synonymous with a battery. This
approach would treat similarly situated taxpayers identically.
For example, suppose two female employees are sexually
assaulted. Whereas the first one struggled with her assailant and
received numerous cuts and bruises, the second one did not struggle.
The first employee has evidence of a physical injury, but the second
employee does not have a single bruise. If physical evidence, such as
a scratch or a bruise were required for the section 104 exclusion, the
second employee's damage award would be taxable income and the
first employee's award would not. However if courts used battery to
define physical injury, both employees who suffered identical assaults
would be treated identically.
The courts' decision to equate physical injury with a battery
would be appropriate in some circumstances. However if courts were
to require a battery, a taxpayer who has been verbally sexually harassed
will receive different tax treatment than a taxpayer, who has been
sexually harassed by being pinched or grabbed. Because both have
suffered similar injuries, this seems an arbitrary and illogical distinction.
An additional problem may result if battery is equated with a
physical injury. If battery is the standard, courts may apply the
offensive battery doctrine to a taxpayer's damage award. Using the
offensive battery doctrine, courts have expanded battery so that
physical contact is no longer needed. All that is needed is contact with
1 4
clothing or an object closely identified with the plaintiffs body. 1
If battery were synonymous with physical injury, attorneys could easily
bring cases when there was no physical contact and convince a court
that a battery occurred. For example, in Fisher v. Carrousel Motor
Hotel, the court held that the defendant's touching of the plaintiffs
plate while yelling racial epithets was an offensive battery because the

154. See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
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plate was an extension of the plaintiff. 5 If an attorney is successful
in bringing an offensive battery claim, a court will find a battery and
the client will avoid taxation of his or her damage award. But, this
would defeat the amendment's requirement of physical injury.
Besides using battery as the legal test, courts might turn to
existing statutory definitions. Scattered throughout the United States
Code there are various definitions for "physical injury or bodily
injury.""' 6 For example, title 42, section 13031 of the United States
Code, states that a physical injury "includes but is not limited to
lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe bruising or
serious bodily harm . . . . "1 Likewise title 18, section 1365 of the
United States Code, defines bodily injury as "a cut, abrasion, bruise,
bum or disfigurement; physical pain; illness; impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty; or any other
injury to the body, no matter how temporary ... ."158
Both definitions are similar and could provide guidance to the
courts. The definition found in section 13031 deals with physical
injury as it relates to child abuse. 5 9 Therefore, it is possible that the
courts would be reluctant to apply this definition to the general
populace. However, courts might also be reluctant to apply the
definition in section 1365 because this section defines bodily injury and
not physical injury. 160 This definition cannot be used unless the
courts are willing to equate bodily injury with physical injury.
Furthermore, the section 1365 definition includes pain, while section
13031 does not. Accordingly, section 1365 is the broader defini16 1
tion.
Although a broad definition could defeat Congress's intent to
clarify the tax treatment of damages, the definition in section 1365 is
more useful. Under section 1365, a taxpayer will not need to
demonstrate physical signs of an injury, but instead the taxpayer could
demonstrate that he or she suffered pain as a result of another's

155. Id. at 629.
156. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997) ("IT]he term 'physical injury'
includes lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe bruising or serious bodily
harm."); 42 U.S.C. § 13031(c)(2) (1994) (identical language).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 13031(c)(2) (1994).
158. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1365(g)( 4 ) (West Supp. 1997).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 13031. Also, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 is entitled Child Victims' and Child
Witnesses' Rights. Because it also deals with physical injury to children and because the language
defining physical injury is identical to § 13031, these sections are treated as one in the discussion.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1365.
161. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 13031.
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tortious actions. 112 For example, a taxpayer who suffered whiplash
or a soft tissue injury in an automobile accident might not have
evidence of a physical injury. Nonetheless, the taxpayer was injured.
Under the broader definition of section 1365, the taxpayer's pain would
be the result of a bodily/physical injury. Hence, the taxpayer's
damages would fall under the section 104 exclusion.
Notwithstanding the broad definition in section 1365, courts will
still be able to draw arbitrary distinctions. The taxpayer who is
sexually assaulted will receive greater preferential tax treatment than a
victim of sexual harassment. The broader definition will still exclude
those taxpayers who have suffered dignitary wrongs without sustaining
signs of a physical injury. Inevitably, Congress must make choices,
and those choices can lead to arbitrary distinctions. However, a
distinction based on the nature of the injury is a poor choice.
Congress's amendment will not clarify the tax treatment of
damages. Although Congress has narrowed the section 104 exclusion
to require a physical injury, courts are left to define physical injury.
Consequently, there will be more litigation on this issue. Furthermore,
avoidance of taxation creates a huge incentive for taxpayers and
attorneys to fit their claim under the section 104 exclusion. Therefore,
as long as the tax treatment of damages depends on arbitrary distinctions, this tax issue will be heavily litigated.
The Tax Treatment of Emotional Distress Damages Should not
Depend on Whether the Taxpayer Suffered a Physical Injury
The Small Business Act also amends the tax treatment of damages
received for emotional distress,'63 by including those damages as
taxable income." A mental injury is treated as something less than
a physical injury. Thus, even if the taxpayer suffers severe physical
injury as a result of the emotional distress, the taxpayer's damages will
still be taxable income. The tax code should not treat the taxpayer
who suffers a broken leg any differently than the taxpayer who, as a
result of sexual harassment, suffers from an ulcer and migraine
headaches. Both victims have suffered physical injuries and pain as a
result of tortious or illegal conduct.
The new law specifically addresses emotional distress that causes
a physical injury. However, the new law does not address the situation
when the taxpayer has both a physical injury and emotional distress.
B.

162. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(4).
163. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605.
164. See id.
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The House Report states that any damages that flow from a physical
injury are excluded from gross income.' 65 Accordingly, if the
taxpayer can demonstrate that the emotional distress flowed from the
physical injury, section 104 should exclude the damage award from
income. "'
Consider, for example, a taxpayer who is seriously injured in a car
accident. He has a broken neck, broken arms and legs, and cannot
move. His child is in the passenger seat, also seriously injured.
Because of his injuries, he cannot go to the aid of his child and must
sit there and watch his child die. The taxpayer has suffered emotional
distress because he has been unable to assist his child and has had to
watch his child die. The emotional distress flowed from the physical
injury because if he had not been injured, he might have been able to
help his child. Consequently, section 104 should exclude his damages
from taxable income.
C.

The Tax Treatment of Damages Should Depend on the Type of
Award, not the Type of Claim
Instead of focusing on the taxpayer's injury or lack thereof, one
possible solution would be for Congress to focus on the type of damage
award received. Section 104 should draw a distinction between
damages reimbursing the taxpayer for an economic loss and damages
reimbursing the taxpayer for a personal loss. Furthermore, section 104
should identify those damage awards that will be taxable income. For
instance, lost profits and back pay would be legitimate sources of
revenue. In addition, section 104 should list those damages that will
not be taxable income, such as compensatory damages like emotional
distress and pain and suffering.
Section 104 should exclude from taxable income all compensatory
damages. By their nature, compensatory damages are compensation to
make the taxpayer whole.167 Compensatory damages are not an
"accession to wealth."' 68 Thus, they do not meet this definition of
income and should not be taxed. Furthermore, an exclusion for

165. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143-44 (1996).
166. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1677, 1793 (stating that "the exclusion from gross income applies to any damages received based
on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness").
Id.
167. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 390.
168. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1995) (defining income as any
"accession to wealth").
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compensatory damages could be explained by the policy considerations
discussed in Part 1.169
First, under the return of capital theory, compensatory damages
would compensate taxpayers for loss of their human capital of mental
and physical well-being. Thus, a damage award is a return of capital
and should be excluded from income. Second, the compassion or
humanitarianism policy that a taxpayer has suffered enough would
justify excluding all compensatory damages from income. Third,
because compensatory damages may compensate a taxpayer for an
intangible, the imputed income theory is justified. Fourth, because the
taxpayer is a victim of an involuntary transaction the taxpayer's
damage award will not be taxed. Fifth, bunching of income would not
be a concern because a taxpayer would not have taxable income from
the damage award. In sum, the several policy considerations together
support an exclusion for compensatory damages.
Moreover, taxing economic loss and excluding all compensatory
damages would better promote tax policy considerations. As discussed,
income is often defined as an "accession to wealth.""17 Compensatory damages are not an "accession to wealth" because an award for
damages reimburses the taxpayer for a personal loss and does not
increase the value of the taxpayer's mental or physical health.
However, while economic damages, such as back pay and profits, also
reimburse a taxpayer, these damages are indeed an "accession to
wealth." Had a taxpayer not been injured, the taxpayer would have
earned the same amount as the taxpayer was awarded in back pay. If
economic loss were not taxable, a taxpayer would pay less in taxes than
a taxpayer who received the same amount from working. A taxpayer
should not be put in a better tax position because the taxpayer was
injured.
The tax treatment of damages should depend on the type of
damage award received and not on the type of claim. Under this
system, attorneys might seek compensatory damages instead of
economic damages because compensatory damages would not be
taxable. However, even if attorneys were to seek higher compensatory
damages, this might lead to positive results. Different tax treatment
for different damages will give attorneys an incentive to allocate the
damage awards in order to avoid taxation.
In settlements, attorneys can distinguish between compensatory
and economic damages. If settlement agreements were to result in
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170.
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lower taxes, plaintiffs would have a strong incentive to settle. This
would result in less litigation, emptier dockets, and lower court
expenses. The savings in court costs might offset any revenue the
government would lose in taxes. And, if there were obvious abuses in
the settlement process, the IRS could look to the171substance of the
transaction rather than the form of the transaction.
CONCLUSION

The new law does not prevent that which Congress sought to fix.
Under the new law, the tax treatment of damages will still depend on
the nature of the claim. The taxpayer will have to establish a physical
injury or physical sickness. This will lead to arbitrary distinctions and
Furthermore, if it is possible to legally avoid
inequitable results.
taxation of damage awards, this avoidance will provide a significant
incentive for astute attorneys to creatively argue that their clients
suffered physical injuries.
Instead of focusing on what types of injuries will lead to taxable
income, Congress should focus on the true problem: the inherent
contradiction in taxing compensatory damages. Accordingly, only
damages for economic loss should be taxable income.

171. See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1982) (holding that the
substance, not the form of the transaction controls in determining whether taxable income was
realized); see also Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (recognized as holding that the
substance, not the form of the transaction governs the tax consequences).

